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THE LOCKED GATES TO TENSION CITY: 
THE COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL 
DEBATES, THE FEC, AND THE  
TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 
Tommy La Voy* 
ABSTRACT 
 Since John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon walked into a Chicago television studio 
for the first general election presidential debate in 1960,
1
 candidate debates have been a 
fundamental aspect of presidential campaigns and have had broader effects on society at 
large. The Commission on Presidential Debates (“CPD”) has been in charge of organizing 
the general election debates since it was created in 1987 by the Democratic and Republican 
parties.
2
 In its tenure, the CPD has restricted its massive platform almost every election
3
 
to the Republican and Democratic candidates through the use of criteria that seemingly 
follow the law’s requirement of being pre-established and objective.
4
 But the CPD’s 
criteria is neither truly objective, nor nonpartisan; it is effectively bipartisan. By ignoring 
and dismissing complaints about the CPD’s exclusion of third-party and independent 
presidential candidates, the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), which is itself based 
on a bipartisan structure, reinforces the power of the partisan duopoly in American 
presidential elections. 
 There is a strong argument that the FEC should hold the CPD to the legal 
requirement of non-partisan access to is debates. The spirit of the law points in this 
direction. But in this, the law is wrong. Rather than commit to the pretense of entirely 
 * Tommy La Voy (University of Michigan, J.D., 2019; Oberlin College, B.A., 2013) is a 
third-year student at the University of Michigan Law School. He would like to thank the staff of the 
Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law for their support and advice, and his 
friends, classmates, and Professors Ellen Katz and Bill Novak for their help and wisdom on the topics in 
this Note. He would also like to thank Jim Lehrer for his 2011 memoir on moderating the presidential 
debates, TENSION CITY. An earlier blog post by the author on this subject can be found at Tommy La 
Voy, Who Gets to Debate?, MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.mjeal-
online.org/who-gets-to-debate/. The views and opinions set forth in This Note are the personal views 
and opinions of the author.  
 1. See Debate History, COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, http://debates.org/
index.php?page=debate-history (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) (the only presidential debates before 1960 
were intraparty, for primary elections) [hereinafter Debate History]. 
 2. The Commission on Presidential Debates: An Overview, COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL 
DEBATES, https://www.debates.org/about-cpd/overview/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) [hereinafter CPD 
Overview]. 
 3. 1992 Debates, COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, https://www.debates.org/debate-
history/1992-debates/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2018). 
 4. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.13 (2017); CPD Overview, supra note 2. 
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open access in the elections, the FEC should revise its regulations to reflect the reality: 
American politics is run through a two-party system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is a popular myth that the first televised presidential debate, held in Sep-
tember 1960 between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon, was the triumph of 
style over substance.5 The belief that radio listeners thought Nixon won the de-
bate, while television watchers were swayed by Kennedy’s visual charisma, is based 
on weak empirical data and further biased by the demographics of the people who 
still did not own a television in 1960.6 But Nixon himself may have been persuad-
ed, as he refused to participate in any more televised debates, which ensured that 
there were no presidential debates in 1968 and 1972.7 
After Nixon, presidential candidates were once more willing to debate each 
other. The televised presidential debates returned, sponsored by the League of 
Women Voters in 1976, 1980, and 1984.8 Between 1984 and 1988, the Democratic 
and Republican National Committees joined together to take control of the presi-
 5. Marie Morelli, 3 Myths about First Presidential TV Debate between Kennedy, Nixon, SYRACUSE.COM 
https://www.syracuse.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/09/3_myths_about_first_presidential_debate_betwee
n_kennedy_nixon.html (last updated Sept. 26, 2016) . 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. History, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, https://www.lwv.org/about-us/history (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2018).  
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dential debates and formed the Commission on Presidential Debates (“CPD”).9 
The CPD claims it was formed to ensure stability in presidential debates, in con-
trast to the presidential debates between 1976-1984, which were “hastily arranged 
after negotiations between the candidates that left many uncertain whether there 
would be any debates at all.”10 The CPD has sponsored every televised general 
election presidential debate since 1988.11 
The thirty debates sponsored by the CPD since 1988 have had a total viewer-
ship of over 1.6 billion.12 Eighty-four million people watched the first presidential 
debate in the 2016 general election, a race in which 137 million votes were cast.13 
Access to this massive platform is controlled by a bipartisan joint venture between 
the Democratic and Republican parties.14 FEC regulations require that the CPD, 
in its role as a “staging organization,” act in a nonpartisan way; it may not simply 
select the nominees of the two major parties to participate in its debates.15 The 
CPD is nominally following the law as it selects debate participants based on seem-
ingly neutral criteria.16 Candidates must: be constitutionally eligible for the presi-
dency, have a mathematical possibility of winning the electoral college, and poll at 
15 percent or more in an average of five surveys.17 
But only one independent or third-party candidate has ever been invited to 
participate in a CPD debate.18 The Libertarian and Green parties have challenged 
the CPD’s criteria by filing an administrative complaint with the Federal Election 
Commission (“FEC”) and are now pursuing judicial review after their complaint 
was dismissed in Level the Playing Field v. FEC.19 In the greatest legal success to 
date in third-party candidates’ attempts to be included in presidential debates, a 
 9. The League of Women Voters and Candidate Debates: A Changing Relationship, LEAGUE OF 
WOMEN VOTERS, https://www.lwv.org/league-women-voters-and-candidate-debates-changing-
relationship (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Changing Relationship]. 
 10. CPD Overview, supra note 2. 
 11. Our Mission, COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, http://debates.org/index.php?
page=about-cpd (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
 12. Debate History, supra note 1; A.J. Katz, The Presidential Debates Set Ratings Records in 2016, 
ADWEEK (Oct. 24, 2016, 5:30 PM), http://www.adweek.com/tvnewser/the-presidential-debates-set-
ratings-records-in-2016/309089. 
 13. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, OFFICIAL 2016 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 
7 (2017), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016presgeresults.pdf.  
 14. See Harrison Wills, Debate Commission’s Own Hot Topic, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 2, 2012), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/10/debate-commission/ (stating “[t]he board of directors of 
CPD, a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) organization, certainly seems far more bipartisan than nonpartisan”). 
 15. “For general election debates, staging organizations(s) shall not use nomination by a particu-
lar political party as the sole objective criterion to determine whether to include a candidate in a de-
bate.” FEC Candidate Debate Rule, 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (2017).  
 16. See CPD Overview, supra note 2. 
 17. Id. 
 18. 1992 Debates, supra note 3. 
 19. Level the Playing Field v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 232 F. Supp. 3d 130 (D.D.C. 2017).  
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federal judge has ordered the FEC to reconsider and better explain its rejection of 
this complaint.20 
If the third-party candidates are successful in court, the FEC will face two op-
tions: enforce the law as it stands, which requires nonpartisan access to the debates, 
or revise and clarify their regulations to allow for staging organizations to be bipar-
tisan. The former would be in line with an idealized view of American politics; just 
as any kid can grow up to become president, any independent or third-party presi-
dential candidate can participate in a debate. But the latter would more honestly 
reflect the overpowering two-party system that is the result of how our govern-
ment and elections are structured.21 
This note examines the legal structure controlling presidential debates through 
the hook of campaign finance. In Part I, I lay out the legal and historical back-
ground, explaining the relevant aspects of the Federal Election Campaign Act, the 
FEC, the CPD, and presidential debates in the U.S. In Part II, I discuss third-
party and independent candidates’ access to presidential debates generally. In Part 
III, I focus on an administrative complaint against the CPD filed with the FEC on 
behalf of third-party candidates, and the subsequent litigation. And in Part IV, I 
discuss the potential remedies that the FEC can employ. 
I.  LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Federal Election Campaign Act and the FEC 
The origin of campaign finance reform can be traced back to 1907, when Ted-
dy Roosevelt and Congress banned corporate contributions to political cam-
paigns.22 The current regulatory structure was put in place when Congress passed 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”) which required disclosures 
of federal campaign contributions, placed limits on media expenditures, established 
a public funding option for presidential campaigns, and created the legal frame-
work for Political Action Committees (“PACs”).23 Congress amended FECA in 
 20. Id. at 148. 
 21. See Aaron Blake, Why are There Only Two Parties in American Politics?, WASH. POST: THE 
FIX (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/04/27/why-are-there-
only-two-parties-in-american-politics/. 
 22. Mission and History, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/about/mission-
and-history/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2018); Jack Beatty, A Sisyphean History of Campaign Finance Reform, 
THE ATLANTIC (July 2007), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/07/a-sisyphean-
history-of-campaign-finance-reform/306066/. 
 23. The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law: Historical Background, FED. ELECTION 
COMMISSION, https://transition.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml#Historical_Background (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2019) [hereinafter FEC Historical Background]; 52 U.S.C. § 30101 (2012).  
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1974, and created the Federal Election Commission, an independent regulatory 
agency that administers and enforces federal campaign finance law.24 
The FEC is headed by a six-member commission, no more than three of 
whose members can be from the same political party.25 Four votes are needed for 
any official FEC action, a requirement that was set “to encourage nonpartisan deci-
sions.”26 This peculiar characteristic of the FEC leads to “frequent 3-3 deadlocks 
on key votes” and as a result, the FEC has been criticized as an “institution de-
signed to fail.”27 The FEC’s paralysis crisis is so serious that Ann Ravel, FEC 
Chair in 2015, remarked that the “likelihood of the laws being enforced is slim . . . 
I never want to give up, but I’m not under any illusions. People think the FEC is 
dysfunctional. It’s worse than dysfunctional.”28 Ravel agreed with a New York 
Times report29 that the FEC is effectively making “unofficial law” by its dead-
locked votes and referenced a quote from a campaign finance lawyer in a Washing-
ton Post article30 that “we are in an environment in which there has been virtually 
no enforcement of the campaign finance laws.”31 The FEC’s systemic deficiencies 
can lead to under-and non-enforcement of federal election laws without requiring a 
deadlocked vote. It is worth noting that the Commission is not nonpartisan; it is 
bipartisan, a fact recognized by the Supreme Court.32 Thus, the FEC can—at least 
theoretically—agree harmoniously on actions (and inactions) that disadvantage 
third-party and independent candidates. 
When the FEC and Congress have attempted structural reform to federal 
campaign finance laws, they have had a difficult time in the Supreme Court. In 
Buckley v. Valeo in 1976,33 the Court developed a theory that using money to influ-
 24. FEC Historical Background, supra note 23; 52 U.S.C. § 30101 (2012). 
 25. Leadership and Structure, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/about/
leadership-and-structure/ (last visited Jan 27, 2018). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Republican Election Commissioners Just Released Key Legal Documents—Nearly a Decade Too 
Late, MOTHER JONES, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/02/federal-election-commission-
republicans-mother-jones/ (last visited Jan 14, 2019). 
 28. Eric Lichtblau, F.E.C. Can’t Curb 2016 Election Abuse, Commission Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/us/politics/fec-cant-curb-2016-election-abuse-
commission-chief-says.html. 
 29. Nicholas Confessore, Election Panel Enacts Policies by Not Acting, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/26/us/politics/election-panel-enacts-policies-by-not-acting.
html. 
 30. Matea Gold, Trump’s Deal with the RNC Shows how Big Money is Flowing Back to the Parties, 
WASH. POST (May 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-deal-with-the-rnc-
shows-how-big-money-is-flowing-back-to-the-parties/2016/05/18/4d84e14a-1d11-11e6-b6e0-
c53b7ef63b45_story.html. 
 31. See, e.g., Ann M. Ravel, Opinion, Dysfunction and Deadlock at the Federal Election Commission, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/opinion/dysfunction-and-deadlock-
at-the-federal-election-commission.html. 
 32. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981). 
 33. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  
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ence an election is equivalent to political speech, and thus is protected under the 
First Amendment.34 The Court used this principle to strike down the 1974 FECA 
amendment’s overall limits on what a campaign can spend and limits on what 
wealthy candidates can spend on their own behalf.35 In Citizens United,36 the Su-
preme Court famously struck down the ban on corporate financing for advertise-
ments that are “susceptible to no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal 
to vote for or against a specific candidate.”37 That ban, which had been put in place 
by the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (also known as McCain–Feingold), 
had already been narrowed down from applying to all “electioneering communica-
tions” by the Supreme Court in 2007.38 
Despite these setbacks, FECA has the potential for robust enforcement be-
yond relying upon the FEC’s actions. FECA states that “[a]ny person who believes 
a violation of this Act . . . has occurred, may file a complaint with the Commis-
sion.”39 If the Commission fails to act on that complaint within 120 days, or dis-
misses the complaint, an aggrieved party may file a petition with the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia.40 The District Court may then find that the 
FEC’s dismissal or failure to act is contrary to law and order the agency to recon-
sider its (in)action within 30 days, “failing which the complainant may bring, in 
the name of such complainant, a civil action to remedy the violation involved in 
the original complaint.”41 The ability to use administrative procedure to privatize 
election law enforcement comes in handy when the enforcement agency has devel-
oped such a reputation for inaction.42 
B.  The Commission on Presidential Debates 
The CPD is a private, nonpartisan organization, categorized under Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, as required for it to be a “staging organi-
zation” per FEC regulations.43 The CPD was formed in 1987 by an agreement be-
tween the chairmen of the two major parties,44 and has sponsored the presidential 
 34. Adam Lioz, Buckley v. Valeo at 40, DEMOS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.demos.org/public  
ation/buckley-v-valeo-40. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 37. Adam Liptak, Justices, 5–4, Reject Corporate Spending Limits, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22scotus.html?pagewanted=all. 
 38. Id.; Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 39. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1) (2012). 
 40. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) (2012).  
 41. Id. 
 42. Katie O’Connor, Obstinate Inaction at the FEC, ACSBLOG (Mar. 1, 2017), 
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/obstinate-inaction-at-the-fec. 
 43. CPD Overview, supra note 2; 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(a) (2017). 
 44. CPD Overview, supra note 2.  
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and vice-presidential debates in every general election since 1988.45 The debates it 
sponsors draw tens of millions of viewers and are moderated by prominent journal-
ists such as Gwen Ifill, Bob Schieffer, and Jim Lehrer.46 
The parties, through the CPD, took over the role of debate sponsor for the 
1988 presidential election, a role that the League of Women Voters Education 
Fund (“League”) played for the prior three presidential election cycles.47 The 
League accused the Democratic and Republican parties of “trying to steal the de-
bates from the American voter,”48 and then waged a public battle over this move, 
arguing that this “change in sponsorship . . . put control of the debate format in the 
hands of the two dominant parties [and] deprive[s] voters of one of the only 
chances they have to see the candidates outside of their controlled campaign envi-
ronment.”49 The CPD did invite the League to co-sponsor the last debate in 1988, 
but the League would have had to agree to “its 16 pages of conditions not subject 
to negotiation,” which had been “negotiated ‘behind closed doors’ and was present-
ed to the League as ‘a done deal.’ ”50 The League refused to participate and put out 
this statement: 
The League has no intention of becoming an accessory to the hoodwink-
ing of the American public . . . the agreement [. . .] gave the campaigns 
unprecedented control over the proceedings. [League President] Neuman 
called “outrageous” the campaigns’ demands that they control the selec-
tion of questioners, the composition of the audience, hall access for the 
press and other issues . . . . Neuman said she and the League regretted 
that the American people have had no real opportunities to judge the 
presidential nominees outside of campaign-controlled environments.51 
The League specifically objected to each campaign having a dedicated telephone 
line to the debate’s television producer, pre-approval of the moderator’s script, and 
 45. Id. 
 46. Debate History, supra note 1; A.J. Katz, The Presidential Debates Set Ratings Records in 2016, 
ADWEEK (Oct. 24, 2016, 5:30 PM), http://www.adweek.com/tvnewser/the-presidential-debates-set-
ratings-records-in-2016/309089. 
 47. See Changing Relationship, supra note 9. Notably, the League invited independent presidential 
candidate John Anderson to be a part of its debate in September 1980. Both Anderson and Ronald 
Reagan accepted, but Jimmy Carter declined to participate. The debate was held without him. Presiden-
tial Debate in Baltimore (Reagan-Anderson), UNIV. OF CAL., SANTA BARBARA: THE AM. PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT (last visited Mar. 18. 2018), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29407. 
 48. Phil Gailey, Democrats and Republicans Form Panel to Hold Presidential Debates, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 19, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/19/us/democrats-and-republicans-form-panel-to-
hold-presidential-debates.html. 
 49. Changing Relationship, supra note 9. 
 50. League Refuses to “Help Perpetrate a Fraud”, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS (Oct. 3, 1988), 
https://www.lwv.org/newsroom/press-releases/league-refuses-help-perpetrate-fraud. 
 51. Id.  
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control over “the pattern for rebuttal and follow-up questions.”52 Despite these ob-
jections, the CPD has sponsored every general election presidential debate since 
this conflict in 1988.53 
The CPD’s debates are major cultural events: they are frequently parodied by 
Saturday Night Live,54 were dramatically imitated by the sole live episode of The 
West Wing,55 and have produced popular internet memes.56 The media treats the 
presidential debates as “a kind of Super Bowl for American democracy.”57 Closely 
tied to the popular conceptions of democracy and the marketplace of ideas,58 the 
debates have been lauded as the most crucial events in a presidential campaign re-
lated to “public involvement in the electoral process.”59 Presidential debates are 
analyzed as a curious standout in an fragmented media environment; tens of mil-
lions of people watch the same “live event television, the last remaining civic 
common in an atomized world.”60 But the debates have also been ridiculed as “vac-
uous exchanges”61 and dismissed as shallow and theatrical.62 Analyses of the CPD’s 
 52. Jack Nelson, Bipartisan Group to Sponsor L.A. Debate After League of Women Voters Drops Out, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-10-04/news/mn-3511_1_presidential-
debate. 
 53. CPD Overview, supra note 2. 
 54. See, e.g., SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE, Donald Trump vs. Hillary Clinton Town Hall Debate Cold 
Open – SNL, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qVMW_1aZXRk. 
 55. Frazier Moore, Who Won the ‘West Wing’ Live Debate?, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/07/AR2005110700196.html. 
 56. See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, Presidential Debate Spins ‘Binders Full of Women’ Meme, Fact Checks, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 17, 2012, 9:35 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/
2012/10/17/163071667/  presidential-debate-spins-binders-full-of-women-meme. 
 57. Denise-Marie Ordway & John Wihbey, Presidential Debates and Their Effects: Research 
Roundup, JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE (Sept. 20, 2016), https://journalistsresource.org/studies/ poli-
tics/elections/presidential-debates-effects-research-roundup. 
 58. See Bill Moyers & Michael Winship, Ditch the debates: Without Effective Moderators, the Presi-
dential Debates are Pointless, SALON (Sept. 20, 2016, 5:59 AM), 
https://www.salon.com/2016/09/20/ditch-the-debates-without-effective-moderators-the-presidential-
debates-will-hurt-democracy/ (arguing that the sham-like nature of the debates is a threat to American 
democracy); Len Niehoff, Opinion, The Marketplace of Ideas has Crashed, DETROIT NEWS (Dec. 1, 2016, 
2:18 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2016/12/01/marketplace-ideas/94692632/ (tying 
together the lack of discussion of climate change in the debates to the failure of the greater marketplace 
of ideas); Charles S. Faddis, The Presidential Debates: Let Them Talk, HILL (Aug. 18, 2016, 6:33 AM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidential-campaign/291760-the-presidential-debates-let-them-
talk (arguing that the presidential debates would be improved without the influence of a moderator). 
 59. Opinion, First, Three Big Debates, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/
2000/ 09/06/opinion/first-three-big-debates.html. 
 60. David Carr, TV Debates That Sell More Than Just Drama, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/business/media/televised-debates-that-sell-more-than-just-
drama.html. 
 61. Ronald P. Seyb, Letter to the Editor, DEBATES; Unfair Play, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/08/arts/l-debates-unfair-play-501883.html.  
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debates seem to confront two different issues. First, there is the question of wheth-
er general election presidential debates should carry much significance given the 
reputation for style over substance.63 Second, and more pertinent to the context 
behind this analysis of the CPD’s debates, is whether the debates matter. 
The short answer to the second question is likely yes, that presidential debates 
do matter.64 The closer a race is, the more impactful the debates can be.65 That still 
does not take into account the other effects debates can have beyond their impact 
on the presidential election. The “binders full of women” line from a 2012 debate 
between Mitt Romney and Barack Obama was more than just an awkward, humor-
ous meme;66 it was seen as an expression of how far women still had to go in the 
workplace.67 Hillary Clinton’s discussion of implicit bias in a 2016 debate with 
Donald Trump was noted for having “moved to the forefront of public conversa-
tion an issue that scientists have been studying for decades.”68 Regardless of the 
direct impact on an election, the debates can have a broader impact on society. 
Given its role in elections and the millions of dollars in contributions the 
CPD receives to stage its debates,69 the CPD is subject to FECA and the FEC’s 
regulations, particularly those concerning staging organizations, as outlined below. 
The CPD cites FEC regulations on its website, where it outlines the criteria for 
selection to participate in its debates.70 The selection criteria are: 
[I]n addition to being Constitutionally eligible, candidates must appear 
on a sufficient number of state ballots to have a mathematical chance of 
 62. See Charles McNulty, Critic’s Notebook: Presidential Debates as Theater, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 
2012), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/culture/la-et-cm-mcnulty-presidential-debates-
20121022-story.html. 
 63. See Kenneth T. Walsh, Style over Substance, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 23, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-23/presidential-debates-a-victory-for-style-over-
substance. 
 64. Andrew Prokop, Do Presidential Debates Matter? Here’s the Political Science Evidence, VOX 
(Sept. 26, 2016, 8:09 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/9/12/12847632/debates-trump-clinton-polls-
political-science. 
 65. Id. (“The data shows . . . that small changes, of a few percentage points or so, are com-
mon.”). 
 66. Peralta, supra note 56. 
 67. See, e.g., Elmira Bayrasli & Lauren Bohn, Binders Full of Women Foreign Policy Experts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2015, 12:03 PM), https://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/10/binders-full-of-women-
foreign-policy-experts/; Elizabeth Dwoskin & Craig Timberg, Uber’s Search for a Female CEO has been 
Narrowed Down to 3 Men, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2017/08/04/ubers-search-for-a-female-ceo-has-been-narrowed-down-to-3-men/. 
 68. Daniel A. Yudkin & Jay Van Bavel, The Roots of Implicit Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/opinion/sunday/the-roots-of-implicit-bias.html; see also John A. 
Powell, Implicit Bias in the Presidential Debate, BERKELEY BLOG (Sept. 27, 2016), 
http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2016/09/27/implicit-bias-in-the-presidential-debate/. 
 69. Wills, supra note 14. 
 70. CPD Overview, supra note 2.  
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winning a majority vote in the Electoral College, and have a level of sup-
port of at least 15 percent of the national electorate as determined by five 
selected national public opinion polling organizations, using the average 
of those organizations’ most recently publicly-reported results at the time 
of the determination. The polls to be relied upon will be selected based 
on the quality of the methodology employed, the reputation of the poll-
ing organizations and the frequency of the polling conducted. CPD will 
identify the selected polling organizations well in advance of the time the 
criteria are applied.71 
The final criterion, that a candidate poll at a minimum of 15 percent in national 
polls, is a major point of contention for third-party and independent presidential 
candidates that want to be on stage at the debates.72 
C.  Candidate Debate Regulations 
In its role of enforcing federal campaign laws, the FEC has enacted regula-
tions that cover debates for federal elections and the organizations that run these 
debates. These regulations include 11 C.F.R. § 110.13,73 in which the FEC defines 
“staging organizations” and establishes how candidate debates can be structured to 
avoid “the general ban on corporate contributions to or expenditures.”74 Staging 
organizations must be either 501(c)(3) or (c)(4) nonprofits that “do not endorse, 
support, or oppose political candidates or political parties . . . . ”75 The debate itself 
 71. Id. 
 72. Jonathan Easley & Ben Kamisar, Third-Party Candidates Face Uphill Climb to Get Place on 
Presidential Debate Stage, HILL (May 12, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/ 
279624-third-party-candidates-face-uphill-climb-to-get-place-on-presidential (“Johnson has railed 
against the commission and its criteria, describing it as a rigged process designed by a closed cabal of 
Republicans and Democrats hell-bent on maintaining power by keeping insurgent candidates at bay.”). 
 73. The FEC defines staging organizations as: “(1) Nonprofit organizations described in 26 
U.S.C. 501(c)(3) or (c)(4) and which do not endorse, support, or oppose political candidates or political 
parties may stage candidate debates in accordance with this section and 11 C.F.R. 114.4(f).” 
11 C.F.R. § 110.13(a)(1) (2017). The FEC also establishes rules for selecting which candidates may par-
ticipate in a debate: 
Criteria for candidate selection. For all debates, staging organization(s) must use pre-
established objective criteria to determine which candidates may participate in a debate. For 
general election debates, staging organizations(s) shall not use nomination by a particular 
political party as the sole objective criterion to determine whether to include a candidate in 
a debate. For debates held prior to a primary election, caucus or convention, staging organi-
zations may restrict candidate participation to candidates seeking the nomination of one par-
ty, and need not stage a debate for candidates seeking the nomination of any other political 
party or independent candidates.  
11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (2017). 
 74. Level the Playing Field v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 232 F. Supp. 3d 130, 135 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 75. 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(a)(1) (2017).  
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must include at least two candidates, and cannot be structured in a way “to pro-
mote or advance one candidate over another.”76 Section 110.13(c) requires that 
staging organizations use “pre-established objective criteria” to select debate partic-
ipants.77 A general election debate may not use the nomination by a particular po-
litical party as the “sole objective criterion to determine whether to include a can-
didate in a debate.”78 Participants must selected through objective criteria 
established in advance of the debate, not including nomination by a party, for the 
debate’s organizer to be able to qualify as a staging organization.79 
If the requirements found in 11 C.F.R. § 110.13 are met, regulations allow a 
staging organization to use its own funds and “accept funds donated by corpora-
tions or labor organizations . . . to defray costs incurred in staging candidate de-
bates . . . .”80 This is vital. Absent explicit authorization by the FEC, the platform 
that the CPD offers candidates would fall under FECA’s blanket ban on corporate 
and labor union contributions to federal campaigns.81 
The Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in Citizens United,82 paired with the D.C. 
Circuit’s SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission decision months later,83 
opened the floodgates for corporate contributions to independent groups focused 
on influencing elections (i.e., “Super” PACs).84 But while corporations may make 
their own independent expenditures to support candidates or donate to Super 
PACs, the law still bans direct corporate contributions to the candidates’ actual 
 76. 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(b)(2) (2017).  
 77. 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (2017).  
 78. Id. 
 79. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(a)(1) (2017); 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (2017).  
 80. FEC regulations read:  
(f)  Candidate debates.  
(1) A nonprofit organization described in 11 CFR 110.13(a)(1) may use its own funds 
and may accept funds donated by corporations or labor organizations under paragraph 
(f)(3) of this section to defray costs incurred in staging candidate debates held in ac-
cordance with 11 CFR 110.13. . . . (3) A corporation or labor organization may donate 
funds to nonprofit organizations qualified under 11 CFR 110.13(a)(1) to stage candi-
date debates held in accordance with 11 CFR 110.13 and 114.4(f).  
11 C.F.R. § 114.4(f) (2017). 
 81. 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012).  
 82. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 83. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (2010). In applying the recent Cit-
izens United decision, the D.C. Circuit, which determined that independent expenditures “do not give 
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption,” held that the government could not use protection 
against corruption or the appearance of corruption as justification to limit contributions to groups that 
make only independent expenditures. See Adam Liptak, Courts Take On Campaign Finance Decision, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/us/politics/27campaign.html. 
 84. Libby Watson, 6 Years Later, the Impact of Citizens United Still Looms Large, SUNLIGHT 
FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2016), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/01/21/6-years-later-the-impact-of-
citizens-united-still-looms-large/.  
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campaign organizations.85 Without the FEC’s regulatory blessing, staging organi-
zations would be accepting millions in corporate contributions and then turning 
around to effectively donate to the candidates who are selected to participate in 
their debates by granting them a televised platform before a massive audience. 
This is why debate organizers like the CPD need to fall under the FEC’s regulato-
ry definition of “staging organizations”; otherwise, these groups would be funnel-
ing corporate contributions to candidates in violation of federal law.86 
II.  THIRD-PARTY AND INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES’ ACCESS TO THE 
DEBATES 
Some independent presidential candidates have very real effects on elections. 
Considering popular disillusionment with the two main parties, these effects could 
continue to grow.87 Gallup recently recorded the popular desire for a third major 
political party at an all-time high of 61 percent in the U.S.88 Third-party candi-
dates’ attempts at inclusion in the presidential debates are widely reported,89 as is 
their seemingly inevitable exclusion.90 An editorial by the Chicago Tribune in late 
August 2016 called for the inclusion of Libertarian candidate Gary Johnson in the 
upcoming presidential debates, citing polling by Quinnipiac University that 37 
percent of respondents would consider voting for a third-party candidate.91 More-
over, 62 percent thought that Johnson should be allowed to participate in the de-
bates.92 This editorial is just a recent example of a long line of ineffective calls for 
 85. Who Can and Can’t Contribute, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/help-
candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/who-can-and-cannot-contribute/ (last visited Feb. 
3, 2018). 
 86. Contributions are “anything of value given, loaned or advanced to influence a federal elec-
tion.” Types of Contributions, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-
committees/candidate-taking-receipts/types-contributions/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).  
 87. David Smith, Most Americans Do Not Feel Represented by Democrats or Republicans – Survey, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2016, 5:49 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/25/american-
political-parties-democrats-republicans-representation-survey. 
 88. Lydia Saad, Perceived Need for Third Major Party Remains High in U.S., GALLUP (Sept. 27, 
2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/219953/perceived-need-third-major-party-remains-high.aspx. 
 89. See, e.g., David Weigel, Libertarians Hope Rallies and Ads can Nudge Them into the Presidential 
Debates, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/libertarians-hope-
rallies-and-ads-can-nudge-them-into-the-presidential-debates/2016/08/27/2517567c-6b9d-11e6-8225-
fbb8a6fc65bc_story.html. 
 90. See, e.g., David Weigel, Third-Party Candidates Miss Cut for First Presidential Debate, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/09/16/third-
party-candidates-miss-cut-for-first-presidential-debates/. 
 91. Editorial, Clearing a Debate Path for Gary Johnson, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 29, 2016, 7:45 AM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-gary-johnson-debate-clinton-trump-edit-
0830-md-20160829-story.html. 
 92. Id.  
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the presidential debates to include third-party candidates.93 These pleas for inclu-
sion make intuitive sense. Independent and third-party candidates are included in 
the presidential election; it seems odd that they are not included in the presidential 
debates. It also seems to go against the law. 
The CPD is hostile to third-party presidential candidates. At the time of its 
creation, the two co-chairmen stated as much to the press: “Mr. Fahrenkopf indi-
cated that the new Commission on Presidential Debates . . . was not likely to look 
with favor on including third-party candidates in the debates . . . . Mr. Kirk was 
less equivocal, saying he personally believed the panel should exclude third-party 
candidates from the debates . . . .”94 Since 1988, only one independent or third-
party candidate for president has been invited to a CPD debate: Ross Perot in 
1992.95 Other third-party candidates have complained,96 sued,97 and even set up 
their own alternative debates.98 But no independent presidential candidate since 
1992 has come close to the portion of the popular vote total that Perot received: 
18.9 percent.99 That includes  Perot in 1996, when he was shut out of the CPD de-
bates and went on to receive 8.4 percent of the popular vote.100 
That independent candidates have been excluded from the debates does not 
mean that their campaigns are inconsequential—Americans still vote for them. 
Ross Perot’s campaign was influential in determining who would be elected presi-
 93. See, e.g., John Nichols, Editorial, Open the Presidential Debates!, NATION (Aug. 29, 2012), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/open-presidential-debates/; see also Editorial, Let Nader Debate, 
CRIMSON (Oct. 10, 2000), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2000/10/10/let-nader-debate-pwhen-
green-party/. 
 94. Gailey, supra note 48. 
 95. See 1992 Debates, supra note 3. Perot, a billionaire, spent $64 million—about $115 million in 
2018 dollars—on his 1992 campaign. Melissa Yeager, The Trump Question: How do Self-Financed Candi-
dates Fare in Elections?, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2015, 12:09 PM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/
2015/08/28/the-trump-question-how-do-self-financed-candidates-fair-in-elections/; US INFLATION 
CALCULATOR, https://www.usinflationcalculator.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) (converting $64 mil-
lion in 1992 to 2018 dollars).  
 96. Nader Upset Over Likely Exclusion from Debates, CNN (June 17, 2004, 7:13 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/06/17/nader.debates/index.html. 
 97. See, e.g., Level the Playing Field v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 232 F. Supp. 3d 130 (D.D.C. 
2017). 
 98. Annie Groer, Third-Party Candidates Finally Get Their Own Presidential Debate, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 24, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2012/10/24/third-party-
candidates-finally-get-their-own-presidential-debate/. 
 99. FED. ELECTIONS COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 92 at 9 (June 1993), 
https://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe1992/federalelections92.pdf; Christopher Klein, Here’s How Third Party 
Candidates Have Changed Elections, HIST. CHANNEL (May 31, 2018), 
https://www.history.com/news/third-party-candidates-election-influence-facts. 
 100. 1996 Popular Vote Summary For All Candidates Listed On At Least One State Ballot, Fed. Elec-
tion Commission (Oct. 1997), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe1996/gevote.htm; Pete Tucker, How 
Third Parties Are Kept Out of Presidential Debates, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 03, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/pete-tucker/what-the-hell-how-third-p_b_11277474.html.  
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dent in 1992.101 The exact outcome of elections without third-party candidates is 
uncertain. There is reason, however, to expect that Green Party voters would ei-
ther vote for Democrats or not vote at all, while Libertarian Party voters would 
vote for a Republican-heavy mix of the two parties.102 The official results from the 
infamous 2000 election in Florida show a gap of 537 votes between George W. 
Bush and Al Gore, compared to 97,488 votes for Ralph Nader (and 138,016 votes 
across all independent candidates).103 In 2016, the Green Party’s Jill Stein’s 51,643 
votes in Michigan compare to a gap between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton 
of 10,704.104 Stein’s 49,941 votes in Pennsylvania outnumber that state’s Trump-
Clinton gap of 44,292.105 The Wisconsin Trump-Clinton gap of 22,748 votes was 
under Stein’s total Wisconsin vote of 31,072.106 Libertarian candidate Gary John-
son significantly outperformed Stein in each of these states.107 The Clinton-Trump 
gaps in Minnesota and Maine (states which Clinton won) also were smaller than 
each of Johnson and Stein’s vote totals.108 This is not to say that independent can-
didates necessarily change the outcome of presidential elections, but they wield 
that potential. 
III.  LITIGATION 
Third-party candidates have not just complained about their treatment by the 
CPD; they have also sued the CPD, filed complaints with the FEC about the 
CPD, and then sued the FEC for failing to act on those complaints.109 The law-
suits against the CPD itself have largely been a wash; Ralph Nader sued the CPD 
 101. See Katie McNally, The Third-Party Impact on American Politics, UVA TODAY (Aug. 3, 2016) 
https://news.virginia.edu/content/third-party-impact-american-politics (arguing that Ross Perot partial-
ly split the Republican vote and led to the election of a Democrat). The Perot campaign’s singular focus 
on the federal government’s deficits was also impactful in bringing about the balanced budgets of the 
late 1990s. Id. 
 102. Euel Elliott, Commentary, What Voters’ Frustrations Mean for Third-Party Candidates, 
FORTUNE (June 7, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/06/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-third-party-
candidates/. 
 103. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 2000 OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 
(Dec. 2001), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm. 
 104. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2016: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. 
PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 33 (Dec. 2017), 
https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/federal elections2016.pdf. 
 105. Id. at 39. 
 106. Id. at 44. 
 107. Id. at 33, 39, 44. 
 108. Id. at 31, 33-34. 
 109. See, e.g., Connie Farrow, Nader Sues Debate Commission, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2000, 10:09 
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20001017/aponline220928_000.htm; Alan 
Rappeport, Third-Party Groups Sue F.E.C. to Try to Open Up Presidential Debates, N.Y. TIMES: 
FIRSTDRAFT (June 22, 2015, 6:33 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/06/22/third-
party-groups-sue-f-e-c-to-try-to-open-up-presidential-debates/.  
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for physically barring him from the debates in 2000 and settled for lawyers’ fees 
and an apology eighteen months later.110 Gary Johnson and Jill Stein sued the CPD 
directly for violating their First Amendment free expression rights by refusing to 
include them in its debates in 2012.111 The suit also alleged that the CPD violated 
the Sherman Antitrust Act by being, in effect, an agreement to restrain competi-
tion in presidential debates.112 This concept has been explored academically, albeit 
with little expectation of success in court.113 The D.C. District Court dismissed the 
suit for lack of standing and, alternatively, failing to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted.114 The D.C. Circuit upheld the dismissal in 2017.115 
Johnson, Stein, and their parties have fared better by taking a route through 
administrative law. As discussed above, 52 U.S.C. § 30109 allows private parties to 
file complaints with the FEC and petition the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia to review the complaints should the FEC dismiss the complaint or 
fail to act.116 Johnson, Stein, and their parties filed a complaint with the FEC about 
the CPD’s exclusion of third-party candidates, as did another organization, Level 
the Playing Field (“LPF”), and its head, Peter Ackerman.117 When both complaints 
were dismissed, LPF, Ackerman, Johnson, Stein, and the Libertarian and Green 
Parties sued the FEC in the District Court, where litigation is ongoing.118 Should 
the plaintiffs succeed in court, they will be allowed to sue the CPD directly 
through a private right of action to enforce FECA.119 While the third-party candi-
dates and their parties still have far to go, they have come as close as anyone to 
opening the door to the CPD debate stage. 
 110. Will Lester, Ralph Nader Settles Lawsuit, SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN (Apr. 17, 2002), 
http://www.semissourian.com/story/70279.html. 
 111. Brian Doherty, Dismissal Upheld by D.C. Appeals Court in Gary Johnson Lawsuit Regarding 
Presidential Debates, REASON (Aug. 29, 2017, 6:53 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2017/08/29/dismissal-
upheld-by-dc-appeals-court-in. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Samuel F. Toth, The Political Duopoly: Antitrust Applicability to Political Parties and the Com-
mission on Presidential Debates, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 239, 276 (2013) (stating that “[t]he Supreme 
Court’s sweeping statements in direct opposition to antitrust application in the political arena would 
probably be very influential in a court’s analysis”). 
 114. Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 869 F.3d 976 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 115. Id. at 979. 
 116. See supra Section I.A.  
 117. Level the Playing Field v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 232 F. Supp. 3d 130, 137 (D.D.C. 2017). 
LPF was created by Peter Ackerman, a fund manager and former board member of the libertarian Cato 
Institute, and has been funded entirely by over $2.6 million in donations by Ackerman. Ctr. For Re-
sponsive Politics, Level the Playing Field—Donor Search, OPENSECRETS.ORG 
https://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail_donors.php?ein=471788821&cycle=2016 (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2018). 
 118. See Level the Playing Field, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 137.  
 119. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109 (2012).  
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A.  The Administrative Complaint 
LPF’s 2014 administrative complaint lays out its criticism of CPD’s alleged 
violation of FEC regulations regarding the 2012 debates.120 The FEC’s summary 
for their staging organization regulations refers to “establish[ing] a structure for 
various types of nonpartisan debates . . . ,” stating that “[a] properly held nonparti-
san public candidate debate sponsored by a qualified nonpartisan organization pro-
vides a forum for significant candidates to communicate their views to the pub-
lic.”121 This is codified in the FEC’s requirement that staging organizations “be 
501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) organizations – which by law face significant restrictions on 
political activity – that do not ‘endorse, support, or oppose political candidates or 
political parties.’”122 
But the CPD is an inherently partisan—bipartisan—organization.123 It was 
created by the two major parties to wrest control of the debates away from the 
League of Women Voters.124 The parties had clashed with the League over control 
of debate structure, as well as the fact that the League had included independent 
candidate John Anderson in a 1980 debate.125 The parties envisioned bipartisan 
“televised joint appearances,” as they wrote in their memorandum of understand-
ing.126 
LPF and its co-plaintiffs argue that the 15 percent threshold is so high that it 
is designed to guarantee that only the Democratic and Republican nominees will 
qualify: “[n]o third-party or independent candidate has satisfied the CPD’s polling 
criterion in the four election cycles in which it has been in place; nor would Ross 
Perot have satisfied it had it been in effect in 1992 or 1996.”127 Further, the LPF 
 120. Exhibit I—Administrative Complaint Filed with the FEC by Level the Playing Field, Detailing 
Why the CPD’s Rules Violate the Law, CHANGE THE RULE, http://www.changetherule.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/AdministrativeComplaint.pdf [hereinafter Admin. Complaint]. The Libertarian 
and Green parties filed a separate complaint in 2015, which makes very similar arguments. See Level the 
Playing Field, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 136. 
 121. Funding and Sponsorship of Candidate Debates, 44 Fed. Reg. 39,348 (July 5, 1979) (to be 
codified at 11 C.F.R. § 100.4(b)(16) & 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(18)). 
 122. Admin. Complaint, supra note 120, at 15 (internal citations omitted). 
 123. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
 124. Changing Relationship, supra note 9. 
 125. Admin. Complaint, supra note 120, at 16-17. 
 126. Id. at 18-19. The complaint goes on to detail the ways in which the CPD has rolled over to 
comply with the two parties’ desires, including the inclusion of independent candidate Ross Perot in 
1992, which both parties wanted. Id. at 23. Further, the CPD is run by major donors and boosters of the 
two parties and is funded by corporations that also make massive contributions to the two main parties. 
Id. at 26-29. 
 127. Id. at 34. The parties cite “polls conducted over October 2 to 4 [1992] by the CBS 
News/New York Times, the ABC News/Washington Post, and CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll – three 
of the five polls the CPD has previously purported to rely on in applying the 15% rule – had Perot at 7, 
9, and 10%, respectively.” The 1992 Campaign: Polls; Despite Perot’s Re-entry, Clinton Retains Big Lead, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/07/us/the-1992-campaign-polls-despite- 
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states that the CPD measures the 15 percent statistic by making arbitrary decisions 
about which polls to use:128 polls that are based on the decisions of pollsters about 
which candidates’ names to include in the surveys.129 
The complaint closes by arguing that the CPD, by taking in millions in corpo-
rate contributions to stage bipartisan debates that exclude independent and third-
party candidates, is furthering the corruption and appearance of corruption of the 
electoral process.130 Given that it has flouted the FEC’s regulations on how a stag-
ing organization can behave, the CPD is alleged to be “funneling corporate money 
to pay for the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates’ most-watched 
campaign appearances,” in violation of “the strict rules FECA places on political 
contributions and expenditures.”131 By effectively excluding independent candi-
dates, the CPD is allowing corporate funds to provide a platform for both of the 
major parties’ candidates to reach tens of millions of viewers, contrary to law. 
B.  Judicial Review 
By allowing complainants to bring suit against the FEC when their complaints 
are dismissed or ignored, FECA provides a potential avenue for litigation to lead 
to reforming the CPD’s 15 percent rule. In 2015, the FEC dismissed both LPF’s 
administrative complaint (and the similar one filed by the Libertarian and Green 
parties) by voting to find no “reason to believe” that the CPD violated the law.132 
The FEC explained its decision by noting “that past administrative complaints . . . 
had “made similar allegations,” and that in those cases the FEC had found no rea-
son to believe that the CPD and its co-chairs had violated regulations or the 
FECA.”133 Further, the FEC’s prior analysis of the “CPD’s fifteen percent re-
quirement had been reviewed and upheld in Buchanan v. Federal Election Commis-
sion.”134 
The LPF and the Libertarian and Green Parties responded to the FEC’s dis-
missal of their complaints by filing suit in the D.C. District Court, alleging that 
the FEC’s dismissal violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 
perot-s-re-entry-clinton-retains-big-lead.html. Objectivity “incorporates a ‘reasonableness’ require-
ment,” and “as one federal court has explained, a criterion that ‘only the Democratic and Republican 
nominees could reasonably achieve’ does not satisfy the FEC’s rules.” Admin. Complaint, supra note 120, 
at 11 (citing Buchanan v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58, 74 (D.D.C. 2000)). 
 128. CPD Overview, supra note 2. 
 129. Admin. Complaint, supra note 120, at 41-42 (explaining the greater volatility in predicting 
turnout, key to the accuracy of a poll, associated with the inclusion of new and independent voters). 
 130. Id. at 58. 
 131. Id. at 57-58. 
 132. Level the Playing Field v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 232 F. Supp. 3d 130, 137 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Buchanan v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000).  
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because it was “arbitrary, capricious an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law.”135 They asserted: 
That the FEC: (1) applied a legal standard contrary to the text of the reg-
ulations; (2) failed to properly consider the submitted evidence; (3) failed 
to consider the allegations raised against most of the respondents; and (4) 
ultimately reached the wrong conclusion regarding the objectivity of the 
CPD’s debate requirement.136 
The plaintiffs moved for summary judgement, which was granted.137 
The court found that because the FEC had failed to elaborate the legal stand-
ard it employed to dismiss these complaints, it had effectively adopted the legal 
standard used to dismiss the prior complaints that it cited as precedent.138 The 
court held that this older legal standard—that the complainants “have not provided 
evidence that the CPD is controlled by the [Democratic National Committee] or [Re-
publican National Committee]”—is “contrary to the text of the agency’s own regula-
tions.”139 The FEC’s regulations, the court noted, are concerned with nonprofit 
organizations that “support, endorse, or oppose” candidates, not with the control 
test.140 The plaintiffs did not allege that the Democratic National Committee and 
Republican National Committee actually control the CPD, but rather “the CPD 
and its directors acted on a partisan basis to support those parties.”141 In summarily 
dismissing these complaints by relying on bad precedent, the FEC was instinctive-
ly protecting the bipartisanship of the CPD and its 15 percent rule. 
The court found that its task was “made all the more difficult” because of how 
much evidence the FEC did not address “or outright ignored.”142 In Buchanan, 
where the District Court ruled that the FEC’s decision to allow the 15 percent rule 
was not itself arbitrary or capricious, the record lacked the substance (such as ex-
pert reports) that was included by the complainants in this case.143 Thus, the 
FEC’s reliance here on Buchanan was “misplaced.”144 Here, complainants put to-
gether “substantial and lengthy evidence and arguments,” which the FEC did not 
even mention, nor did the agency present any real “legal analysis applying the 
agency’s regulation.”145 
 135. Level the Playing Field, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 137. 
 136. Id. at 137. 
 137. Id. at 148. 
 138. Id. at 139. 
 139. Id. (citations omitted, emphasis in original). 
 140. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at 144. 
 143. Id. at 145. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id.  
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Having found that the FEC applied the wrong legal standard (or failed to ex-
plain its rationale), failed to reasonably consider the evidence before it (or failed to 
explain that it had considered the evidence), and failed to “demonstrate that it ac-
tually considered the full scope of [the] evidence,” the court agreed with the plain-
tiffs that the FEC acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unlawfully in dismissing their 
two complaints.146 The FEC was ordered to reconsider the complaint and issue a 
new decision within 30 days, or else LPF may renew its litigation.147 
Judge Chutkan issued her order granting summary judgment in February 
2017, and it has been many more than thirty days since the order.148 Litigation in 
the case remains ongoing.149 Even if the plaintiffs fully prevail at this stage, they 
would need to bring a successful suit against the CPD to enforce FECA and the 
FEC’s regulations regarding staging organizations. Still, this decision marks the 
greatest potential to date in third-party and independent candidates’ attempts to 
gain access to presidential debates. The FEC effectively rubber-stamped the 
CPD’s actions based on the precedent of the last time they rubber-stamped the 
CPD’s actions, but this time they ignored “substantial” evidence.150 It seems that 
the agency will need to come up with a better basis to satisfy the court that its dis-
missal of these complaints against the CPD are not arbitrary and capricious. 
IV.  REMEDIES 
Outside of their characteristic inaction,151 the FEC can pursue one of two 
main remedies regarding the presidential debates. The first is to follow the letter 
and spirit of the law by actually requiring staging organizations to be nonpartisan 
and recognizing that the CPD excludes third-party candidates by intent and effect. 
The second is to revise its own regulations and allow staging organizations to be 
bipartisan, an endorsement of the two-party system as clear as the very structure of 
the FEC’s commission itself. This second option would be more honest about the 
reality of American politics, and about the purpose of the presidential debates. 
A.  Enforcing the Law as It Is Written 
Should the FEC reverse course and determine that there is reason to believe 
that the CPD’s actions violate the law, it would be required to “attempt to remedy 
the violation first through conciliation and then, if unsuccessful, through litiga-
 146. Id. at 140, 145. 
 147. Id. at 145. 
 148. Id. at 130, 148. 
 149. FEC Record: Litigation, Level the Playing Field v. FEC (District Court), FED. ELECTION 
COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/updates/level-playing-field-et-al-v-fec-district-court-orders/ (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2018). 
 150. Id. 
 151. O’Connor, supra note 42.  
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tion.”152 The simplest way for the CPD to come into alignment with federal elec-
tion law is to drop its 15 percent rule. To replace it with any other requirement for 
popularity in national polling becomes a line-drawing exercise to create an “error-
prone and arbitrary test.”153 The national popular vote is not how the United 
States elects its presidents; based on data from the 2012 election, a candidate could 
win the electoral college, and the presidency, with 23.1 percent of the popular 
vote.154 That particular statistic may be farfetched, but in two of the last five presi-
dential elections and in two of the last three presidential elections without an in-
cumbent running, the loser of the popular vote won the presidency.155 National 
polling does not show does not show who will win the electoral college, which 
makes the CPD’s reliance on national polls an arbitrary decision to use an arbitrary 
measure and an unnecessary way to select candidates for the CPD’s debates. 
The immediate counterargument to dropping the 15 percent threshold is that 
it would allow too many participants into the debates for them to remain effective. 
But the CPD’s current criteria, other than the 15 percent rule, are sufficient to 
keep its debate stage both accessible and uncrowded. The requirement that a can-
didate be on enough state ballots to have a mathematical shot at winning 270 elec-
toral college votes is itself a significant barrier. Ballot access is “often difficult,” es-
pecially for candidates without party resources and expertise. 156 Each state has its 
own requirements for independent candidates to be placed on the ballot, often re-
quiring the signatures from thousands of voters, distributed across congressional 
districts, or a certain percentage of registered voters in the state.157 On the other 
hand, nominees of established parties can have near-automatic ballot access.158 In 
large part due to the difficulty in gaining access to a sufficient number of state bal-
lots, the greatest number of independent or third-party candidates in any election 
 152. Level the Playing Field v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 232 F.Supp.3d 130, 136 (D.D.C. 2017) 
(citing 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i), (a)(6) (2012)). 
 153. Admin. Complaint, supra note 120, at 5. 
 154. Danielle Kurtlzeben, How to Win the Presidency with 23 Percent of the Popular Vote, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Nov. 2, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/11/02/500112248/how-to-win-the-
presidency-with-27-percent-of-the-popular-vote. 
 155. See D’Angelo Gore, Presidents Winning Without Popular Vote, FACTCHECK.ORG (Dec. 23, 
2016), https://www.factcheck.org/2008/03/presidents-winning-without-popular-vote/. 
 156. Jeff Cohen et al., Why Not Open the Debates to Others?, FAIR (Sept. 24, 2000), 
https://fair.org/article/why-not-open-the-debates-to-others/. 
 157. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC’YS OF STATE, SUMMARY: STATE LAWS REGARDING 
PRESIDENTIAL BALLOT ACCESS FOR THE GENERAL ELECTION (Oct. 2016), http://www.nass.org/
sites/default/files/surveys/2017-08/research-ballot-access-president-Oct16.pdf. 
 158. Virginia, for example, requires 10,000 petition signatures from qualified voters, including at 
least 400 from each congressional district, for an independent candidate to get ballot access. Id. But the 
nominees from established parties only had to have their names given to the state board of elections 74 
days in advance of the election to appear on the Virginia ballot. Id. Established parties are defined as 
“an organization which received at least 10% of the total vote cast for any statewide office at either of 
the two preceding statewide general elections.” Id.   
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since 1988 to meet the criteria of having a mathematical chance of winning was 
five, in 2000. This number has often been three or fewer.159 Had the CPD dropped 
this requirement in 2016, four candidates would have qualified: Clinton, Johnson, 
Stein, and Trump.160 So long as the electoral college is the method by which the 
United States chooses its president, it seems a rational basis by which the CPD 
should choose the participants for its debates in order to comply with the legal re-
quirement of nonpartisanship. 
B.  The FEC Should Adapt to the Reality of the Two-Party System 
Expecting open access to presidential debates regardless of party membership 
sounds in freedom, liberty, and the American way. But the American reality is that 
of the two-party system. While George Washington, the only independent presi-
dent in U.S. history,161  was warning his constituents about the danger of factions 
and partisanship,162 the other founding fathers were founding parties.163 The Fed-
eralists and Democratic-Republicans began our American tradition of a partisan 
duopoly with the election of our second president, John Adams.164 The two current 
major parties have been cemented in place since before the Lincoln-Douglas de-
bates.165 Only once since 1852 has there been a presidential candidate that placed 
first or second that was not a member of the Republican or Democratic parties, and 
his face is carved into Mount Rushmore.166 In terms of tradition and history, the 
two-party system is actually as American as apple pie, which also reached mass 
popularity in the late 18th century.167 
In our current political reality, third-party and independent candidates will 
not win the presidency. Ross Perot in 1992, who came the closest since Teddy 
Roosevelt in 1912, may have won 18.9 percent of the national popular vote, but he 
 159. Admin. Complaint, supra note 120, at 49-50. 
 160. Open the Debates Letter, JILL 2016, https://www.jill2016.com/opendebates (last visited Nov. 
11, 2018). 
 161. W.E. Messamore, George Washington: THE Independent OG (Original Gangsta) of US History, 
IVN (Feb. 5, 2018), https://ivn.us/2018/02/05/george-washington-the-independent-og-of-us-history/.  
 162. John Avlon, George Washington’s Farewell Warning, POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 10, 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/washingtons-farewell-address-warned-us-about-
hyper-partisanship-214616. 
 163. Federalist Party, HISTORY (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/federalist-party. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See 1858 Debates, COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, http://www.debates.org/
index.php?page=1858-debates (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
 166. Blake, supra note 21. That candidate was Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, a candidate of his own 
Progressive party, and a former Republican president. Id. 
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received zero electoral college votes—which are the only votes that matter.168 That 
candidates such as Nader in 2000 and Johnson and Stein in 2016 may have played 
the role of spoiler in deciding which major-party candidate won the presidency169 
ought not earn those individuals an invitation to the debates. If, in a tight election 
between a Democrat and a Republican, an independent candidate was popular and 
included on the ballot in a single state with enough electoral college votes to decide 
the election, then that independent candidate could determine who wins the presi-
dency. But while that candidate’s popularity with voters in one state could have an 
outsized impact on the election, she would not be invited to a CPD debate as she 
would not be mathematically able to win the Electoral College, being on only one 
state ballot. Just as mathematical reality does block candidates from access to the 
debates, the law should also allow for political reality to block candidates.170 
The stability that comes from the two-party system, apparent from its nearly 
170-year tenure, has been repeatedly recognized by members of the Supreme 
Court.171 In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, the Court even held that the 
government, based on its interest in a stable political system, may favor the two-
party system so long as it does not “completely insulate” the two parties.172 The 
two major parties have an inherent set of advantages, the Court acknowledged, and 
“[s]tates need not remove all of the many hurdles third parties face in the Ameri-
can political arena today.”173 
The FEC has the authority to update its current regulations requiring nonpar-
tisanship and objectivity.174 But instead, it can and should recognize the value of 
the two-party system’s stability, as authorized by the Supreme Court.175 The FEC 
should use its rulemaking authority through its typical notice-and-comment proce-
 168. FEDERAL ELECTIONS 92, supra note 99.  
 169. Daniel P. Franklin, Abigail C. Bowen & Judd Thornton, Are Third-Party Candidates Spoil-
ers?, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 19, 2017, 2:02 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2017-
01-19/are-third-party-candidates-spoilers-what-voting-data-reveal. 
 170. Political reality includes the structure of congressional representation—single-member dis-
tricts and first-past-the-post voting—which reinforces the two-party system. See, e.g., Thomas F. Schal-
ler, Our Electoral Structure Not Only Shuts Out Third Parties; It Shuts Out Women, BALT. SUN (June 9, 
2015, 3:10 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-schaller-0610-20150609-
column.html. 
 171. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 107 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“The stabilizing effects of such a [two-party] system are obvious.”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 
144-145 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong 
and stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective govern-
ment.”); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 532 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Broad-based political par-
ties supply an essential coherence and flexibility to the American political scene.”). 
 172. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 366-67 (1997).  
 173. Id. at 367. 
 174. See The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION (Feb. 
2017), https://transition.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml (“The Commission clarifies the FECA 
and the public funding statutes through regulations . . . . ”). 
 175. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 366-67 (1997).  
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dure176 to revise its regulations and allow debate staging organizations to be bipar-
tisan, rather than nonpartisan. The agency could then continue its practice of al-
lowing the CPD to be bipartisan in structure and access without abdicating its mis-
sion of enforcing the law. While the FEC is generally associated with gridlock and 
disfunction,177 it is not unreasonable to think that this type of reform, being inher-
ently bipartisan, could be persuasive to four of its six commissioners.178 Given that 
the FEC has defending the status quo in court multiple times,179 it should be feasi-
ble for the agency to endorse it in its regulations and allow staging organizations to 
be openly bipartisan. 
CONCLUSION 
This is not the first time that the idea of dropping the 15 percent rule has been 
suggested.180 But the FEC has reached a critical moment: it has been ordered to 
reconsider its position on access to the presidential debates, meaning that this may 
be the time that nonpartisan access is taken seriously. Or the FEC may revise its 
regulations to reflect the two-party system and allow for staging organizations to 
be bipartisan. Until the FEC takes action one way or the other, the CPD’s struc-
ture will be in violation of the letter and spirit of the law requiring debate staging 
organizations be nonpartisan. 
  
 176. See, e.g., Pending Rulemaking Matters for Comment, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, 
https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/regulations/pending-rulemaking-matters-comment/ (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2018). 
 177. See, e.g., Ravel, supra note 31. 
 178. As of this writing, the FEC is down to four commissioners, a bare quorum, possibly making 
this proposed reform more difficult. Leadership and Structure, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, 
https://www.fec.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).  
 179. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000); Level the 
Playing Field v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 232 F. Supp. 3d 130 (D.D.C. 2017).  
 180. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 156.  
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